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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
The rebottler of another manufacturer's product may no longer hide behind
Prestonettes v. Coty,9 for the Court has correctly pointed out that the Supreme
Court was not concerned with our statute in this case. It involved the effect of a
trade mark as a property right, and although the brief of counsel mentioned
Section 2354, the Court chose to ignore it in its opinion.
D.R.K.
USE OF SIMILAR TRADEMfARK, NOT CALCULATED TO PRODUCE CONFUSION, NOT
ENJOINABLE
The Court ruled that questions of trade mark infringement are to be
determined on the particular facts of each case when in Dell Pub. Co. v. Stanley
Pub., Inc.10 it held that the use of the name "Modern Confessions" was not
an infringement of the registered trade mark, "Modern Romances."
Appellant, Dell Publishing Company, sought reinstatement of an injunction
which had been set aside by the Appellate Division" on the law and facts, as
there was an insufficient offer of evidence to warrant a finding of a reasonable
tendency to cause confusion. The word in question, modern, was a descriptive
word, which had not acquired a secondary meaning through association with
the appellant's product. They based their findings on, among others, the
following facts: that there were approximately 61 publications whose registered
titles contain the word modern; that the content of the two magazines were not
the same; that the quality of the paper, the sale price, the letterhead, and the
"blurb lines" were not the same. The confusion which the trade mark and
unfair competition laws were meant to preclude was nonexistent in this case.
The Court of Appeals accepted this reasoning, pointing out that the law
of trademarks is merely a portion of the broader law of unfair competition, and
that it is intended to prevent one from palming off his goods and/or their origin
as the goods of another.12 Precedents furnish generalizations which provide a
criterion for the determination of disputes involving trademark infringements.
These disputes require pragmatic action, with each case being decided in the
light of its own particular facts.' 3
The Court, after concluding that all past cases were decided on their
own particular facts, articulated the test to be applied. "The test as in unfair
competition, is the likelihood of confusion, regardless of evidence of actual
confusion."'1 4 In this view, it is apparent that had the use of the word
modern been calculated to cause confusion, in spite of a complete lack of
evidence of confusion. it would constitute an infringement. The basis for such
9. 264 U.S. 359 (1924).
10. 9 N.Y.2d 126, 211 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1961).
11. 11 A.D.2d 112, 201 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1st Dep't 1960). The injunction had been
issued by the supreme court in 18 Misc.2d 437, 188 N.Y.S.2d 605 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
12. Supra note 10 at 133, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
13. See Palmer v. Gulf Pub. Co., 79 F. Supp. 731, 737 (S. D. Calif. 1948).
14. Supra note 10 at 134, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 399.
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a finding, of likelihood of confusion, must be founded on a true similarity, and
not merely incidental business competition.
The Lanham act,15 which added to the scope of trade mark infringement,
allowing descriptive words to be registered if they were so indicative of their
owner as to have acquired a secondary meaning, does not go so far as to
prohibit the use of a portion of that title, by another, when it itself is
descriptive of content. "In order to establish a trade mark it must be shown
that 'the primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public
is not the product but the producer'."' 0 It is evident that here the word modern
has not become so identified in the minds of the public, as to warrant a finding
that use by another would be unfair competition. The Court pointed out that
if a buyer went to a newstand and asked for a "Modern" he very likely would
not receive it.
D. R. K.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
COMPENSATION AwARD FOR DEATH CAUSED iBY EMOTIONAL STRESS
Does the New York Workmen's Compensation Law provide benefits for
worrying yourself to death over your job? Purportedly, the Court of Appeals
has answered this question affirmatively in the case of Klimas v. Trans
Caribbean Airways, Inc.' It is this writer's belief, and this note will seek to
show, that the jury is not in yet.
Edward Klimas was maintenance supervisor for the defendant airline.
When one of the defendant's two airplanes was grounded by the Civil Aero-
nautics Authority for wing corrosion in November 1955, Klimas was publicly
blamed and chastised for the incident by the defendant's president. From then
until the time of his death, March 10, 1956, he was under great pressure to
get the plane back in the air. The testimony was that he suffered great
emotional and mental anxiety because of the twin burdens of the threat to his
job and the responsibility for the plane. His deadline was the end of February
1956. On March 3, 1956, the plane was still not ready; so, Klimas went
personally to expedite the repair effort. At this time he was handed a bill for
$266,000 (representing 25%o of the plane's value). From March 3rd until his
death, he worked all day and into the night in an effort to get the bill reduced
as well as to speed the plane's repair. His efforts were unsuccessful in both
respects and the testimony of those who were there with him at this time was
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1958).
16. Supra note 10 at 137, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
1. 10 N.Y.2d 209, 219 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1961). The order of the referee, reviewed and
affirmed by the Board, awarding death benefits to the plaintiff, the widow of decedent, was
reversed by the Appellate Division, 12 A.D.2d 551, 207 N.Y.S.2d 72 (3d Dep't 1960), on
the ground that no physical strain or exertion was shown.
